This is not an argument for diplomatic recognition of Communist China. The two nations need not establish diplomatic relations to speak to one another. Indeed, American and Chinese diplomats are already in regular communication in Warsaw. They hold meetings, exchange diplomatic notes and telephone messages. But this route is often slow and uncertain. Washington, it is true, can flash an urgent message to Warsaw in a matter of minutes, using computer-like teletype machines which automatically code and decode the contents. Our embassy can immediately relay the message to the Chinese embassy. But it is inside the Chinese embassy that a dangerous delay can occur. Our intelligence describes the Chinese communications between Warsaw and Peking as "primitive."

Critics question whether the Chinese would pay heed to a message from Washington. Here is the background:

The U.S. and Red China have held 134 formal meetings since 1955. They began in Geneva and were moved to Warsaw in 1958. There, in a Polish palace left over from an earlier era, they face each other across white, carved tables covered with green linen cloths and separated by an open space—symbolic of the vast ideological gulf between the two nations.

Yet the diplomats have managed, upon occasion, to bridge this great gulf. True, the Chinese negotiators are as rigid as steel beams. But the talks have brought the two antagonists together during more than one dangerous crisis. They have cleared up misunderstandings, prevented miscalculations and provided a clear channel of communication.

President Kennedy, for instance, asked the U.S. negotiators to deliver a warning at the Warsaw meeting in March, 1961, that the U.S. would intervene in the Laos-Communist conflict with military force unless the Chinese permitted a cease-fire. The Chinese negotiators brought back word that China would not force a showdown in Laos but would accept an international guarantee of Laotian neutrality. This ended the Laotian crisis that had the world on tenterhooks.

When President Johnson began bombing North Vietnam, he sent assurance through Warsaw that the U.S. had no designs on the territory of either North Vietnam or Red China. At the Feb. 25, 1965, meeting, U.S. Ambassador John Cabot emphasized that the U.S. did not intend to destroy North Vietnam nor invade China.

The Chinese were almost drawn into serious negotiations over nuclear disarmament during 1962–64. It began with a Chinese charge that the U.S. was "sabotaging" disarmament. In rebuttal, Cabot handed the Chinese a booklet spelling out Washington's views on disarmament. He urged the Chinese to read the booklet and give their reaction.

The sparring continued until the Chinese exploded their first atomic device on Oct. 16, 1964. The next day, the Chinese delivered a letter through the Warsaw channels to President Johnson stating: "China will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons."

At the next meeting, on Nov. 25, Chinese Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan produced a draft of a proposed Chinese-American agreement that neither country would be the first to use nuclear weapons. He called this "practical, fair and reasonable, easily feasible."

Cabot's first response was that the U.S. could not accept mere words which couldn't be verified by inspection nor enforced through international safeguards. Cabot was succeeded by Ambassador John Gronouski, who asked at a meeting on May 25, 1966, whether the Chinese would couple their nuclear-weapons pledge with an agreement to sign the test-ban treaty. Peking later fired back words such as "swindle," "fraud," "preposterous" and "hoodwink"—words, unfortunately, that have become familiar inside Myslewicki Palace where the Chinese and Americans meet.

The Americans have made a number of attempts to put the talks on a more friendly, informal basis. "Let's forget about Taiwans and Vietnams," Gronouski once urged, "and sit down and have a few drinks and tell each other about our private lives." But the RSVP has always been negative.

As frustrating as their meetings have been, there *is* communication. Even during the long intervals between sessions the channel remains open. The Chinese, for example, may deliver a protest note that a U.S. plane has intruded into their air space. Or the U.S. might notify the Chinese that a new satellite is scheduled to pass over their territory. As a diplomatic courtesy, copies of the 1966 Senate hearings on China were delivered to the Chinese embassy in Warsaw.

In the dangerous years ahead, however, the Warsaw link between China and the United States will no longer be sufficient. The highest U.S. officials have told PARADE that *instant* communications between Washington and Peking will soon be essential to world peace.

It has been four years since the Chinese developed their first nuclear bomb. They are expected to master the intercontinental missile in another five years. This will give the next President until the end of his four-year term to arrange a hot line to Peking. In the missile age, indirect communication is too undependable; no communication at all would be folly. And the more tense relations become between East and West the greater the need for communication.

The next meeting in Warsaw will be held after our November election. I urge that the U.S. wait no longer to begin the negotiations for a Washington-Peking hot line.

Sincerely,

Czech

JESS GORKIN,
Editor of Parade.

THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF INFAMOUS MUNICH CONFERENCE

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, today, September 30, is the anniversary of the infamous Munich conference. Thirty years ago today agreements were reached that led to the dismemberment and later alien occupation of a small, beautiful country which boasted a flourishing economy and a thriving democracy.

That 1938 conference in Munich was the single most dramatic episode in international affairs between the two world wars. It was the culmination of months of unbearable tension and marked the high point for the policy of "appeasement." The decisions at Munich begun a political and moral landslide which resulted inevitably in World War II.

Tragically, Czechoslovakia seems destined to remind the world repeatedly that the dilemma of Munich—the dilemma of how democracies desiring peace should deal with dictatorships bent upon aggression—is still with us.

It was with a coup d'état in Prague in 1948 that Stalin completed his conquest of Eastern Europe. Thereafter, the terms "cold war," "Iron Curtain," and "Soviet satellite" took on special meaning in the political lexicon just as "Munich" and "appeasement" had 10 years before. And now, in 1968, we have again witnessed the brutal subjugation of the brave people of Czechoslovakia simply because they sought a measure of individual and national freedom.

Once again Czechoslovakia has reminded us of the Munich dilemma, a dilemma made all the more critical by the growing destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. But I believe that events in Czechoslovakia, deplorable as they continue to be, may have taught us some important lessons which can help solve the "Munich dilemma."

First, we have once again been reminded of the fundamentally repressive nature of true dictatorships. The Soviet rulers of Eastern Europe dramatically demonstrated that they fear progress and reform, that they fear freedom, that they fear to see the uncensored truth printed in the press, and that they fear even modest expressions of independence and patriotism by a subject people. Faced with a choice between maintaining a facade or friendship with the West and of reasserting their control over a vassal state, the Russians' instinct to safeguard their empire won out. Despite all the talk about peaceful coexistence, and about the cold war being over, the Soviets have shown themselves to be as dangerously belligerent as ever.

Second, the tragic events in Czechoslovakia clearly reveal the bankruptcy of America's current foreign policies. This administration has apparently allowed our strategic superiority to slip and our alliances to deteriorate in the vain hope that the Soviets would no longer consider the United States such a formidable opponent. According to the theory of "parity" or equality in armaments which has achieved considerable currency among civilians in the Pentagon, the Russians, having caught up with us, would no longer need fear or feel inferior to America. Therefore, so the theory goes, the Russians would be more inclined to negotiate with us in good faith. The administration's policy planners decided that the Soviets had "mellowed," that they had given up their dreams of destroying capitalism and of dominating the world, and that they had come to accept reform in the Communist bloc.

Based upon such tenuous theories and upon such wishful thinking about Russia's intentions, the successful Republican foreign policies of former times have been routinely and regularly set aside. Let no one forget that these now-abandoned policies produced an end to the fighting in Korea, secured the negotiated withdrawal of Russian troops from Austria—the only country ever occupied and later set free by the U.S.S.R.—and kept the peace all during the Eisenhower years.

Tragically, Czechoslovakia has proven that the Republican approach to foreign policy and to dealing with the Russians has been correct. We, too, are willing and ready to work for peace and for the reduction of international tensions. But we know that dictatorships respect only one thing in an opponent—strength.

Appeasement of dictators will never work.

Therefore, the Republican Party is committed to the restoration of America's strength—in armaments and in allies. Incidentally, I am pleased to note that the Secretary of Defense, in his statement on September 5 exempting the

long-delayed ABM—antiballistic missile—system from funding cuts, has adopted our point of view on the need to negotiate from strength.

There is one final point to be made about the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and that is that this administration does not seem to have learned anything from it. Almost immediately White House sources indicate that President Johnson hoped the fact Russian troops had occupied Prague would not upset his plans for a summit meeting with Premier Kosygin to discuss general disarmament. Why the Soviets should suddenly be expected to keep any prospective agreements made with their self-appointed capitalist enemies in America when they continued to break solemn promises given to their Socialist friends in Czechoslovakia is an important question for which the administration does not seem to have a suitable answer. Let no one forget that 9 days after assuring Party Secretary Dubcek at Bratislava that Czechoslovakia was free to follow its own road toward socialism without outside interference, Soviet troops occupied Prague. Five days after guaranteeing President Svoboda in Moscow that the Soviets would not meddle in their internal affairs, intense pressure was placed on Czechoslovakia's leaders to oust most leading progressives and the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, called for the "liquidation of 40,000 counterrevolutionaries."

Moreover, Vice President HUMPHREY's foreign policy advisers have noted that the Communist camp is no longer a single, unified bloc, rather it is fragmented. To use their terms, communism is no longer monolithic, it is polycentric. These advisers see the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia as the "death rattle" of the Soviet empire, and they urge that the United States go on with current administration policies of attempting to achieve detente with the Russians. While we Republicans would also like to see a relaxation of international tensions, two things seem to be wrong with the Humphrey team's analysis. First, even though there are cross-currents in the Communist world, the Soviet acttion in Czechoslovakia shows that the U.S.S.R. is an imperialistic superpower, ready and willing to use force to achieve its goals irrespective of whether or not other nations approve. It is obvious that a largely self-sufficient superpower with such motivations constitutes a grave threat to the United States and to world peace of and by itself. Second, an unstable world situation, replete with conflict, normally accompanies not only the creation of empire, but also the dissolution of empire. So if Czechoslovakia does indeed signal the "death rattle" of Soviet empire, which is highly speculative, a very dangerous period lies ahead. When a dictatorship gets into serious trouble at home, it usually begins looking for external problems—contrived if necessary—to divert its peoples' attention from growing internal difficulties.

This brings us to the question of what the United States can do about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. No matter how strong one's personal feelings are, no matter how outraged one is by the brutal treatment of the Czechoslovakian people and by the Russians' total disregard for world opinion, I doubt that anyone would seriously recommend that the United States should attempt to reverse the current situation by military action.

However, short of military action there is much which could, and should, have been done by the administration. In the tense weeks before the invasion, when it was apparent that the Soviets were contemplating the use of force, the United States should have issued a stern statement condemning such action in advance and warning officially that the military occupation of Czechoslovakia would have serious repercussions on East-West relations.

Great Britain went on record in advance, why did not the United States?

Apparently even the Johnson administration has belatedly come to recognize that its failure to act diplomatically was a mistake, for the President later issued a similar warning in hopes of dissuading the Russians from invading Rumania.

Many may say that diplomatic representations would not have prevented the Soviets from attacking Czechoslovakia. This may be true, but I for one am not inclined to dismiss so lightly the moral impact of world opinion. Therefore, after the invasion, I think the United States should have pressed much more vigorously for a United Nations resolution condemning the U.S.S.R. Before the situation hardened into its present unsatisfactory state, why was not U.N. Secretary General U Thant directed to send United Nations observers to Prague? It seems that the U.N. is always quick to investigate outbreaks of violence in the free world—why should not they operate on the Communists' side of the line once in a while?

If, as is likely, the Russians refused to allow neutral observers to enter Czechoslovakia, the completely unpopular and undemocratic nature of the Soviet action would at least have been underscored before the world. In 1956, America and her friends were able to obtain a U.N. resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and the Russians were forced to prohibit U.N. observers from entering that occupied country. This action allowed the West to remind the world officially at each session of the United Nations that the U.S.S.R. was an imperialistic power and that Khrushchev's cynical comment that "the world will soon forget Hungary" would not be allowed; to stand unchallenged. In fact, it was not until this administration began its current attempts to befriend the Russians that the United States stopped raising the question of the Soviet rape of Hungary in the United Nations.

Third, we should immediately make clear to those who wish to flee from Czechoslovakia that they will be welcome in the United States. After the Soviets crushed the revolt in Hungary in 1956, President Eisenhower sought and received special legislation from Congress to permit large numbers of refugees to immigrate to the United States. Within a year nearly 32,000 Hungarians settled permanently in our country. We have also made it clear that we will provide refuge for all Cuban citizens who wish to escape the Communist tyranny in their homeland. Should we do any less for the brave people of Czechoslovakia?

Fourth, we should suspend for the time being further efforts to conclude further specific agreements with the Soviet Union—both to show our condemnation of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and to allow for a "cooling off" period while we assess Soviet intentions in central Europe. It should be noted that the Soviets have moved seven divisions into East Germany and have delivered a threatening note to West Germany warning Bonn to change its policies or "face the consequences." They have also accused the Austrian Government of allowing Czech "counterrevolutionaries" to operate from bases in Austria. Moreover, Pravda has told the United States in very insulting tones that Czechoslovakia is none of America's business and has suggested that we are "confused" if we think the occupation of Czechoslovakia has changed the balance of power in Europe.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—NPT—now pending before the Senate is one specific step toward détente which I believe should be delayed for the time being. Although the spread of offensive nuclear weapons should be prevented, the treaty presupposes a degree of confidence in the U.S.S.R. which is difficult to feel in the aftermath of the attack on Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the NPT probably should be reviewed by a new administration because it makes no distinction between the spread of offensive and purely defensive nuclear weapons. In view of the latest evidence of Russia's aggressive nature, we might well want to reconsider the question of supplying purely defensive ABM's to our European allies.

Finally, the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia provides the United States with an unparalleled opportunity to breathe new life into NATO. During the past nearly 8 years, NATO members have been ignored and insulted by Democratic administrations which were intent on "building bridges" to the East—bridges which passed over the heads of our allies in the West.

As Prime Minister Macmillan once remarked, "Alliances are held together by fear, not by love." The speed with which the Russians occupied Czechoslovakia has caused concern and fear to spread through Western Europe. The Chancellor of West Germany has repeatedly asked for a high-level NATO meeting to review Western Europe's defenses. However, President Johnson and Vice President HUMPHREY seem more inclined to have a high-level meeting to discuss disarmament with the Russians than to meet with our worried allies to discuss problems of our common defense.

Yet, only with the loyal cooperation of allies will the burdens of maintaining the peace weigh less heavily upon the United States.

In my view, it is high time for a change of policies—and a change of administra-

tions—in Washington. It is high time that we stopped treating our enemies like neutrals, neutrals like friends, and friends like enemies.

I ask unanimous consent that a statement entitled "Lessons From Czechoslovakia," written by Ira C. Eaker, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LESSONS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(By Ira C. Eaker)

The fog of war has lifted over Czechoslovakia sufficiently, and the dust of invasion has settled enough, so that the most astigmatic can see the battered, bloody corpse of Freedom lying in the streets of Prague.

There are now some questions which can be asked, some pertinent observations which can be made and perhaps some lessons for our citizens and our leaders.

How could the men in the Kremlin have dared to commit this brutal crime against international law and human justice?

They were realists. They knew that world opinion seldom succors the weak and never deters the strong. They learned that at the time of the rape of Hungary.

The USSR had succeeded in the destruction of NATO, with the help of that gang boss of the NATO wrecking crew, President Charles DeGaulle, and no longer feared any reprisal from that quarter.

Kremlin leaders had watched the U.S. operations in Vietnam where we failed to take decisive steps for fear of what Russia or Red China might do. They saw Ho Chi Minh outwit us at Paris. They exulted as our Senate doves castigated our President for responding to the call for help from the South Vietnamese. Our spineless response to the Pueblo piracy removed any worry about U.S. aid to Czechoslovakia.

The Reds divined, again correctly, that the United Nations had neither the will nor the power to punish or halt their aggression.

Why did they consider it necessary to punish the Czech Communists for their deviation? The reach for freedom in Czechoslovakia, if allowed to persist, might incite the Poles and East Germans to attempt similar experiments. It could even spread to Russia and lead to further unrest there. The Reds, being practical always, know that it is much easier to extinguish a fire in its early stages.

The timing of the cruel invasion of Czechoslovakia may be fortuitous in some ways, the fact of it can be turned to advantage in some areas.

The fear that the Reds would influence our November elections to our disadvantage has now been removed. They can no longer elect a dove by false hopes of detente or peace.

Those of our leaders who have said that Communism is no longer a monolith and therefore no longer a danger have now been fully exposed. They stand naked in their delusions, convicted as dangerous visionaries.

It must now be clear that we must abandon immediately the policy of unilateral disarmament followed for the past eight years. No critical new weapon system has been developed in all that time despite earnest and unanimous requests from all our military leaders. Some weapons have been upgraded, like Minuteman and Poseidon, but no new major ones have been initiated—no new bomber, no new interceptor, nor any new antisubmarine devices.

Instead, our former strategic superiority of five to one is now reduced to parity, and parity becomes automatic inferiority since our announced policy permits the enemy to strike the first blow.

Perhaps we shall now hear less senseless cooing from the Senate doves, who thus far have expressed more apology for the Russians than sympathy for Czechs. Hopefully we can be done with the nonsense of building bridges to the East and about detente with the Reds. Should the police build bridges to the Mafia or seek detente with criminals?

This does not mean that we should be truculent or provocative toward the USSR or meddle or fish in Red waters. It does mean that we should shed our fears, equal their realism, understand the kind of people we are dealing with and restore our military superiority to such levels that Kremlin leaders will respect it as they did when they pulled their missiles out of Cuba.

Now, after Czechoslovakia, prudent citizens may demand that prospective leaders take the saliva test of realism.

VIETNAM IS CAUSING POLITICAL DISSENSIONS

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, Michael Harrington is the well-known author of that very important book which some time ago helped reveal the terrible plight of the poor, the book entitled "The Other America." As a sociologist, he is concerned with the opinions of people as they are reflected in the current Presidential campaign.

This is the theme of his discussion in yesterday's Chicago Sun-Times. In looking at the remarkably large degree of support for Mr. Wallace among unionists and other workers, he finds that their shift away from an advanced dometic program toward a new position "which could push the entire society to the right" is one which is "a social cost of Vietnam." The reason is that our investment of $30 billion a year in our war there has made impossible the program which would do the most to cure the ills of the ghetto—the building of sufficient decent housing. As long as our conflict in Vietnam continues, "building new cities and rebuilding the old is so much pie in the sky."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Harrington's article, "The Social Cost of the Vietnam War," may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SOCIAL COST OF VIETNAM WAR

WASHINGTON.—Never have reactionaries been so enthusiastic about the working class. They believe that by appealing to the American unionist's worst instincts he can be won from the Democratic Party.

So George C. Wallace packages racism as a class antagonism between common men and bureaucrats and intellectuals. And Richard M. Nixon, the lace-curtain backlasher, praises "law and order," the current euphenism for keeping the black and white poor in their miserable place, but he is probably more interested in taking Dixiecrats from Wallace than labor from Hubert H. Humphrey.

But is the worker a George Wallaceite or a New Dealer? To a significant minority of the rank and file the answer is tricky: They are both.

Factories are not offices even when they pay middle-class wages. They are loud, dirty, alienating places which have driven workers to a certain solidarity, camaraderie (I hope the word does not frighten Spiro T. Agnew, since I speak more of bowling leagues than Leninism) and egalitarianism. But solidarity and camaraderie can be clannish and suspicious of outsiders; egalitarianism can be anti-intellectual. As long ago as Joe McCarthy, one study found the labor ranks to the right of college-educated Republicans on civil liberties issues, but well to their left on economic matters.

So the AFL–CIO has the most advanced domestic program of any mass organization in the country. Many workers who don't share the liberal values in the union platform followed the leadership for bread and butter reasons. For instance, they voted their frontlash concern for jobs in 1964, fearing Goldwater was Herbert Hoover in disguise, and repressed their backlash sentiments. The secret of Wallace's appeal is not that these unionists have had a drastic change of heart, but that they are reversing the order of long-held, contradictory preferences.

This shift, which could push the entire society to the right, is a social cost of Vietnam. The late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s Chicago fair-housing campaign is a case in point. Dr. King rightly asserted that it was an outrage that Negroes were locked up in filthy slums. White working class homeowners interpreted this as an attack on property which they had struggled to acquire.

The only progressive resolution of the antagonism—to build enough decent housing for both—was politically impossible since we were investing $30 billion in Vietnam instead. So the blacks were sent away with empty promises, embittered and perhaps disillusioned with nonviolence, and the whites began to look for Wallace.

There is, however, a way to combat Wallace effectively, and the vice president knows it as well as anyone else. But I am not at all sure he will carry it through. The Alabaman is, after all, a dangerous fraud whose main base is the open-shop, low-wage South, and any growth in his influence can only depress the living standards of the common man even as it exacerbates the tensions which make him fearful. And it is simple enough to prove on paper that racial justice is in the economic interest of even the backlash white, for it would guarantee him, as well as the Negro, a job and the possibility of a better house.

The catch is Vietnam. As long as that conflict continues, building new cities and rebuilding the old is so much pie in the sky. I have long believed that the vice president's enthusiastic huckstering for the war is unconscionable.

I would cite a relevant authority: Lyndon Johnson. On March 31, the President candidly, and perhaps courageously, admitted that his leadership had so divided the nation that he could no longer govern it. Mr. Johnson then perversely demanded that the vice president campaign for the catastrophe he had just defined, but Humphrey should heed the original words of his chief. Vietnam is the outside agitator making it impossible to end civil dissension in America.

BIAFRA RESOLUTION—IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TRADITION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of discussion recently of a need for rethinking and reshaping our foreign policy to bring it more into step with global political realities. While I may not agree completely with the extreme position that rejects present policy out of hand, the principle of continuous updating the rationale of our foreign policy and its application is certainly a sound one.

However, there is one firm tenet of our foreign policy that has been and must remain in the mainstream of our

foreign relations and that is recognition and protection of the human rights of all men.

Again and again, the United States has made clear to other nations that we cannot tolerate those laws or policies of a nation that deny the basic human rights of their citizens or deprive them of the protection of those same rights.

The occasions on which we as a nation took the part of the oppressed are numerous and we can look upon them with justifiable pride: Czarist Russia, 1911; Ottoman Empire, 1840; Morocco, 1863; Rumania, 1872; Poland, 1918–19; Balkan Wars, 1913; Treaty of Versailles, 1919.

Indeed, Mr. President, it was with this traditional background of deep concern for the rights of the oppressed that the United States led the world in the creation of the United Nations. We recognized that the internal suppression of the rights of men was the cause of ultimate international aggression and destruction of world peace. We realized then, and I hope we realize now, that peace and human rights are inextricably joined together. The violation of rights destroys the possibility for a lasting peace.

Ambassador Goldberg, in testifying before the special Human Rights Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made clear this American tradition of concern for the rights of all men. "Concern for the welfare of all peoples is a principal feature of our foreign policy."

Mr. President, unfortunately the U.S. Senate has failed to make clear that the Senate also subscribes wholeheartedly to this foreign policy tenet that must remain unchanged. We have failed to ratify the various Human Rights Conventions, those fundamental expressions of solemn commitment to the United Nations Charter.

As a matter of fact, in the face of a most horrible mass violation of the most basic right of mankind—that of life itself—the Senate of the United States has even failed to take official notice. There has been no pronouncement from the Congress during the entire course of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war. True it is, that individual Senators have taken the floor to voice their personal outrage and frustration that such an unbelievable loss of innocent lives is taking place a few jet hours from our shores. But Congress has not spoken as a body. Six thousand innocents die every day from starvation in Biafra and we have yet to aver to their deaths.

Mr. President, I trust the Senate will act soon and wish unanimity in approving Senate Concurrent Resolution 80, introduced on September 25 by myself and the bipartisan leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee.

CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN'S WORLD LAW DAY ADDRESS

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, September 16 was World Law Day, a day of which Chief Justice Earl Warren observed that it is "a day not ordained by any authority but by the acquiescence of many thousands of lawyers and judges throughout the world as an annual demonstration of our belief that it is only through law—just law—based upon the fundamental rights of man that universal peace can be achieved."

Justice Warren spoke those words in the course of one of his rare appearances as a platform speaker, when he addressed a body of world leaders in law and justice convened in the Palace of Justice at Geneva in an international observance of World Law Day. His address, whose words are hopeful for the future of intenational cooperation and for increased observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is a wise and dignified statement of the responsibility which nations must assume for their citizens and for each other. The occasion observed the 20th anniversary of the declaration as well as World Law Day.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this address of Chief Justice Warren may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY EARL WARREN, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL OBSERVANCE OF WORLD LAW DAY—HUMAN RIGHTS, SEPTEMBER 16, 1968, PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

It is a wholesome sight to witness a gathering, such as this, of people from every continent of the world, all dedicated in hearts and minds to the cause of universal peace. It is reassuring to know that we are not here to solve any crisis, nor settle any disputes; that we do not represent a partisan faith or religion, a restriction based on race or color or an ideology of government or economics. One's thoughts are not confined to any national boundary lines, but are as expansive as the globe on which we live. Here we do not represent our governments nor their special interests. We are here as individuals, members of the human family—and there is but one family. We are not here to praise some members of that family or to condemn others. We are aware of the frailties of human nature and realize that among some who speak loudly of the brotherhood of man, there have been great departures from the basic principles of humanity, and that among those who have made but few assertions concerning their fundamental commitments there have been some who have, on trying occasions, adhered scrupulously to the dignity of the human spirit and to the rights of man.

And so tonight we meet in this beautiful city of Geneva, in an atmosphere of peace to which this wonderful country has dedicated itself in pursuance of universal peace. We gather together not to profess our accomplishments but to declare our aspirations for the world, based upon our faith in humanity, the kind of faith that is based on things not seen. We know the hour is late and that the world is full of danger, but we are not here to conjure with our fears. We have gathered to take counsel with our better natures, because we know that there will be universal observance of human rights only when they are accorded a place in the hearts, minds and hands of men everywhere because they are right.

We meet on what we choose to call World Law Day, a day not ordained by any authority but by the acquiescence of many thousands of lawyers and judges throughout the world as an annual demonstration of our belief that it is only through law—just law—based upon the fundamental rights of man that universal peace can be achieved.

We meet in the year 1968, designated by the United Nations as Human Rights Year in honor of the twentieth anniversary of that great document, the first of its kind in recorded history to be adopted, and without dissent, by the nations of the world in solemn assembly. When we stop to think of the persecutions, the atrocites and the barbarisms that have occurred at times throughout the ages in most lands, it is, indeed, a testament to the inherent goodness of man, that the United Nations could, without dissent, and I quote from its preamble "in recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in world" and then defines those rights explicity in a Universal Declaration of Human Rights so that "even he who runs may read." It is of equal importance to mankind that the various functionaries of the United Nations would earnestly seek, as they have, to embody these basic principles in their daily work.

It would afford everyone inspiration to read it regularly in its entirety but this is not the time to do so. However, we may appropriately take the time to read Article I which is revealing as to the remainder of its contents. It is short and reads as follows:

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood."

From this, the remainder of the great document evolves. From this, we acquire our faith in the objectives of the nations of the world and in the justification for the United Nations itself. Surely there have been departures from it, even gross failures; but the leavening influence of the United Nations and world opinion formed from testing situations by the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have solved some serious situations, ameliorated others, and are constantly working on still others to achieve agreement in accordance with it.

But it must be remembered that the United Nations is not endowed with the authority to enforce these principles. It is not an international code of laws enforceable as such. It is a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the only sanction the United Nations can exact is the influence it can bring to bear on world opinion. The remainder must come from the self-discipline of nations themselves and the aspirations of their people.

As we learn of world events from the news media of the day, we realize what a long and tedious job it is to achieve our goal. There is turmoil stemming from injustice on every continent. But this is not a job for the faint-hearted or for those who are easily discouraged. It is for those who believe fervently that all mankind is one family and that if it is to prosper and live in peace each of us has a definite and inescapable responsibility to the whole family of man. We must take note and encourage every movement to that end. This is no time to despair because much has been done and much is augured for the future. The ethical influence of this universal commitment to human rights over the years has made the Declaration a part of customary international law as an ever-present inspiration and reminder of the rights, aspirations and concerns which men everywhere share.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has stimulated worldwide interest in the recognition and protection of the individual rights of all people. This dynamic rule of moral law has been a catalyst in the mobilization of world opinion toward the respect for basic rights and the implementation of methods of protecting those rights. Within twenty years since the adoption of the Declaration, over twenty-nine conventions and protocols have been recommended